The Practical Application of Discounted Cash Flow to Plant Purchase Using an Integrated Suite of Computer Programs

This paper describes the problems of using DCF techniques for machine tool evaluation. It is shown that many of the technical and financial assumptions traditionally made are erroneous. However, the use of specially devised computer programs allows these problems to be overcome, with the result that the output from the program reveals how previous authors, by using incorrect methodologies, have seriously understated the financial benefits of investing in advanced technology. The paper discusses the difficulties normally experienced when trying to apply DCF principles, and it is shown how these difficulties are alleviated by the use of a correctly structured program.     

Multinational Learning under Asymmetric Information

The aim of this paper is to analyze the competition between a multinational and the incumbent firm in a foreign market under asymmetric information about demand and unobservable outputs. It is shown that the incumbent firm increases its production in the first period to signal to the multinational that the demand is low. The multinational reduces its output in the foreign market in order to signal-jam. In addition, the multinational increases its production in the other market. However, total production of the multinational is lower. Implications for research and development expenditure by the multinational are examined.     

The long-term unemployed,informal economic activity and the ‘underclass’ in Belfast: rejecting or reinstating the work ethic

The notion of an ‘underclass’ existing outside the realm of mainstream society continues to hold sway among journalists and policy-makers. While there are many new contenders for inclusion among the underclass, one of the most enduring group of participants is the long-term unemployed. Work-shy individuals, seemingly content to live on welfare benefits, are regarded as placing themselves outside the boundaries of mainstream economic and social life and passing a host of negative characteristics on to their children. The possibility that some of this group might defraud the welfare benefit system through working while claiming benefits adds further weight to negative images about the characteristics of ‘underclass’ members. The aim of this paper is to challenge some of these common assumptions by examining the ways in which unemployed people in an economically depressed locality in West Belfast relied on informal economic activity to help meet their material needs. Such activity has implications for the underclass debate because, rather than demonstrating commitment to some alternative set of values, informal economic activity drew participants into the wider economy and demonstrated adherence to mainstream values. Moreover, often the debate on social security abuse focuses on the supply side of the issue and is remarkably silent about the demand side of the equation. ‘Doing-the-double’ (working while claiming benefits) was not simply an individual response to unemployment and inadequate welfare benefits but was linked to changes in the labour needs of employers in the wider economy.     

EQUIVALENCE OF COMPETITION MODE IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH DELEGATION

This paper aims to examine the equivalence of competition mode in a vertically differentiated product market with the relative performance delegation. It demonstrates the equivalence of product quality and social welfare in this delegation game, irrespective of modes of product competition. In addition, in a three‐stage game of quality‐delegation‐quantity (or price), it shows that the delegation coefficient is different between high‐quality and low‐quality firms in an asymmetric vertical differentiated model, and a high‐quality firm makes better use of the delegation than a low‐quality firm.     

ACTION,AGENCIES, ADVOCACY,AND ANALYSTS1

Generally speaking, human beings dislike admitting flaws in their actions. The complexities of regional development provide ample opportunity for flawed action. As public intervention in the process of economic and social development is on the upswing, serious attention must be paid to evaluations in order to minimize flaws in the programs. This paper examines three constraints to evaluation: friction generated by data collection; absence of precise goals and modus operandi coupled with continuous program modification; and role conflict within the evaluation team. The difficulties with data lie in the definition of regional boundaries and hostility of the people resulting from normlessness and government involvement. Regional survey research centers are suggested to mitigate the problem. The second conistraint exists because of the sensitivity of program administrators to critical evaluation. They react with vague, general, and illusory goals, discounting and negation of results, and the concept of a pilot study from which “lessons learned always justify a program.” Long-run conditioning and public relations may be the only effective policies to relieve this constraint. The third constraint of role conflict has always existed but is particularly important when changes in programs derive from their evaluations. The solution is for our professions to insist on full public disclosure of results coupled with triyearly turnover of evaluation personnel. De façon générale, les humains détestent avouer leurs fautes. he dévelop-peraent régional étant trés complexe, beaucoup ?actions enterprises pourront s'avérer défectueuses ou néfastes. intervention publique dans le processus de développement économique et social se faisant peu fréqtiente, une attention spéciale et constante doit être apportée aux évaluations visant. à minimiser les erreurs dans les programmes. Cet article eiamine trois contraintes propres à?évaluation: obstacles crées par la cueilette des données; absence de buts prés et de modus operandi joints à une modification continuelle du programme; et conflit de rôle dans ?équipe ?évaluation. Les difficultés avec les données sont liées à la délimitation des régions et à?hostilityé des gens résultant de ?absence compléte de normes et de ?ingérence gouvernementale dans la vie privée. Pour résoudre le probléme, on suggére des centres ?enquétes et de recherches régionaux. La seconde contrainte vient du fait que les administrateurs de programme sont sensibles à une évaluation critique. lis répondent avec des buts vagues, généraux et illusoires; Us ne nient pas les résultats mais n'acceptent pas le concept ?une étude pilote óu “Les resultats obtenus justifient toujours un plan ?amélioration.” Un conditionnement à long terme et des relations extérienres peuvent être les settles politiques efficaces pour parer à cette contrainte. La troisiéme, due au conflit de rôle, a toujours existé mais elle est particu-liérement importante quand les modifications de programme dérivent de leurs évaluations. La solution serait que les associations professionnelles insistent sur une divulgation compléte des réstultats au public ainsi qu'un renouueUement du personnel ?évaluation tous les trois ans.     

ON THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF THE SUPERVISORY GOODWILL CONTROVERSY

We provide evidence on the potential wealth effects of the 1996 U.S. Supreme Court decision that the U.S. government had violated contractual obligations when, in 1989, it passed legislation prohibiting savings and loan associations from counting “supervisory goodwill” as capital. The Supreme Court decision produced large wealth gains for the savings and loan plaintiffs, as did prior court decisions in favor of these savings and loans. However, little evidence exists to suggest negative market responses to important events surrounding the 1989 legislation.     

Currency devaluation and the Cooper paradox in the open-economy macro-disequilibrium model

Zusammenfassung Abwertung und das Cooper-Paradox im Modell einer offenen Volkswirtschaft mit Makro-Ungleichgewicht. - In diesem Aufsatz wird das Cooper-Paradox im Rahmen eines IS-LM-BT-Ungleichgewichtsmodells überprüft. Die Analyse wird dadurch angereichert, da der monet?re “spillover”-Effekt einer Abwertung integriert wird in das Modell einer offenen Volkswirtschaft mit Makro-Ungleichgewicht, in dem unechter Handel zum Ungleichgewichtspreis stattfinden kann. So k?nnen sich die “spillover”-Effekte in der gesamten Volkswirtschaft über die Marktverflechtung verbreiten. Es wird gezeigt, da\ unabh?ngig von der Marshall-Lerner Bedingung die heimische Volkswirtschaft schrumpfen wird, obwohl die Abwertung die Handelsbilanz verbessert (Cooper-Paradox). Au\erdem wird gezeigt, da\ dann, wenn die Marshall-Lerner-Bedingung erfüllt ist, die Abwertung sowohl zu einer Verschlechterung der Handelsbilanz als auch zu einer Expansion der heimischen Volkswirtschaft führen kann. Dieses Ergebnis widerspricht dem, was Cooper in den Entwicklungl?ndern mit einer Abwertung beobachtet hat.

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Resumen Devaluación monetaria y la paradoja de Cooper en un modelo macroeconómico de desequilibrio de una economía abierta. - En este trabajo se estudia la paradoja de Cooper dentro del contexto de un modelo IS-LM-BT de desequilibrio de ?spillover? separable. Se enriquece el análisis mediante la integración del efecto ?spillover? monetario de una devaluación al modelo macroeconómico de desequilibrio de una economía abierta, en el cual se permite el comercio a precio de desequilibrio; el efecto ?spillover? resultante se propaga a toda la economía atraves de los eslabonamientos entre los mercados. Se demuestra que la economía nacional se contrae, a pesar de que la devaluatión favorece al balance comercial (paradoja de Cooper), independientemente de que se satisfaga o no la condición de Marshall y Lerner. Asimismo, se muestra que si se satisface la condición de Marshall y Lerner la devaluación puede dar lugar tanto a una deteriorización del balance comercial como a una expansión de la economía national. Este resultado contrasta con lo observado por Cooper en países en desarrollo que han devaluado.

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Résumé Dévaluation et le Cooper-paradoxe dans un modèle macro-déséquilibre d’une économie ouverte. - Dans cet article l’auteur examine le paradoxe de Cooper en cadre d’un modèle IE-LM-BT. L’analyse est enrichie par l’intégration de l’effet monétaire ?spillover? d’une dévaluation dans un modèle macro-déséquilibre d’une économie ouverte dans lequel le commerce faux peut se passer en prix déséquilibre. C’est pourquoi les effets de ?spillover? peuvent propager dans l’économie entière par les relations d’intermarché. Il est démontré qu’indépendant de la condition de Marshall-Lerner l’économie locale se contracte même si la dévaluation améliore la balance commerciale (le paradoxe de Cooper). Il est aussi démontré que si la condition de Marshall-Lerner est satisfaite une dévaluation peut détériorer la balance commerciale et stimuler l’économie locale en même temps. Ce résultat est contraire à l’expérience de Cooper qui a observé les pays en voie de développement qui dévaluaient leurs monnaies.